Cryptographic Shuffles and Their Applications by 김명선
 
 
저 시-비 리-동 조건 경허락 2.0 한민  
는 아래  조건  르는 경 에 한하여 게 
l  저 물  복제, 포, 전송, 전시, 공연  송할 수 습니다.  
l 차적 저 물  성할 수 습니다.  
다 과 같  조건  라야 합니다: 
l 하는,  저 물  나 포  경 ,  저 물에 적  허락조건
 확하게 나타내어야 합니다.  
l 저 터  허가를  러한 조건들  적 지 않습니다.  
저 에 른  리는  내 에 하여 향  지 않습니다. 




저 시. 하는 원저 를 시하여야 합니다. 
비 리. 하는  저 물  리 적  할 수 없습니다. 
동 조건 경허락. 하가  저 물  개 , 형 또는 가공했  경











(암호학적 셔플과 그 응용)
지도교수 천정희





김명선의 이학박사 학위논문을 인준함
2012년 6월
위 원 장 (인)







submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy




Dissertation Director : Professor Jung Hee Cheon
Department of Mathematical Sciences
Seoul National University
August 2012






Department of Mathematical Sciences
The Graduate School
Seoul National University
For anonymization purposes, one can use a mix-net. A mix-net is a multi-
party protocol to shuffle elements so that neither of the parties knows the
permutation linking the input and output. One way to construct a mix-net
is to let a set of mixers, so called mix-servers, take turns in permuting and
re-encrypting or decrypting the inputs. If at least one of the mixers is honest,
the input data and the output data can no longer be linked. In this role,
shuffling constitutes an important building block in anonymization protocols
and voting schemes. The problem is that the standard shuffle requires anyone
who shuffles the input messages to keep his random permutation and ran-
domizers secret. The assumption of a party keeping the secret information
may be in some ways quite strong.
Secondly, for this anonymization guarantee to hold we do need to ensure
that all mixers act according to the protocol. In general, zero-knowledge
proofs (ZKPs) are used for this purpose. However, ZKPs requires the expen-
sive cost in the light of computation and communication.
In TCC 2007, Adida and Wikström proposed a novel approach to shuf-
fle, called a public shuffle, in which a shuffler can perform shuffle publicly
i
without needing information kept secret. Their scheme uses an encrypted
permutation matrix to shuffle ciphertexts publicly. This approach signifi-
cantly reduces the cost of constructing a mix-net to verifiable joint decryp-
tion. Though their method is successful in making shuffle to be a public
operation, their scheme still requires that some trusted parties should choose
a permutation to be encrypted and construct zero-knowledge proofs on the
well-formedness of this permutation.
In this dissertation, we study a method to construct a public shuffle with-
out relying on permutations generated privately: Given an n-tuple of cipher-
text (c1, . . . , cn), our shuffle algorithm computes fi(c1, . . . , cn) for i = 1, . . . , `
where each fi(x1, . . . , xn) is a symmetric polynomial in x1, . . . , xn. Depend-
ing on the symmetric polynomials we use, we propose two concrete construc-
tions. One is to use ring homomorphic encryption with a constant ciphertext
complexity and the other is to use simple ElGamal encryption with a linear
ciphertext complexity in the number of users. Both constructions are free of
zero-knowledge proofs and publicly verifiable.
Key words: Shuffle, Verifiable Secret Shuffle, Public Shuffle, Mix-net, El-
Gamal Encryption
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We begin with a history of shuffles and related technology, focusing specifi-
cally on the introduction of the verifiable schemes. Details can be also found
in the work of Nguyen et al. [NSK04] and their journal version [NSK06].
1.1 A Brief History of Shuffles
A number of efficient constructions for verifiable shuffles have been pro-
posed [Abe98, Abe99, FS01, Nef01, FMM+02, Nef03, Fur05, Wik05, GL07,
Wik09, BG12]. In Crypto 2001, Furukawa and Sako [FS01] gave a char-
acterization of permutation matrices in terms of two equations that could
be efficiently proved, hence proposing an efficient verifiable shuffle with a
3-round proof system. However, the zero-knowledge property of the proof
system remains an open problem. Furukawa et al. [FMM+02] noted a flaw
in their original proof, proposed a new definition of security for shuffles and
proved security of their system with respect to that definition. Neff later
gave another efficient construction [Nef01], which was based on a generaliza-
tion of Chaum-Pedersen proof of knowledge of equality of discrete logarithms
1
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and the fact that a polynomial of degree n has at most n roots [CP92]. An
improved version of this proof system is given in [Nef03]. However, like the
Furukawa-Sako scheme, the zero-knowledge property of the Neff proof sys-
tem has not been correctly proved and still remains an open problem. All
these schemes use the El Gamal cryptosystem and their security relies on
the discrete logarithm assumption. Based on Neff’s method, Groth [Gro03]
proposed a very efficient proof system that uses homomorphic commitments.
The input ciphertexts in this scheme can be encrypted by any homomorphic
cryptosystem. More recently, Bayer and Groth [BG12] proposed a verifiable
secret shuffle with only sublinear size in the number of senders.
However, all of these shuffle schemes has the common crucial drawbacks
as follows: (1) Each shuffle scheme should rely on the secrecy of permutation
and randomness; (2) For public verifiability, zero-knowledge proof techniques
extensively should be employed, whose cost is usually expensive with respect
to computation and communication. As a more or less direct consequence,
Adida and Wikström [AW07] proposed a way to shuffle the ciphertexts in
public. Later Parampalli et al. [PRT12] improved the computational effi-
ciency.
1.2 Why Shuffling in Public Hard?
The main security objective of a shuffle is to provide unlinkability of its
input elements to output elements, and so effectively keeping the permuta-
tion secret. A second important property of shuffles is verifiability: that is
providing a proof that the output is correctly constructed. Verifiability of
shuffles is used to provide robustness for mix-nets: that is ensuring that a
mix-net works correctly even if a number of its mix-centrers are malicious. If
2
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a shuffle’s proof can be verified by any party, it allows the mix-net to provide
public verifiability: that means the mix-net can prove its correct operation to
any party. These are important properties of mix-nets and so verifiability of
shuffles has received much attention. Shuffles must be efficient and the cost
is measured in terms of computation and communication (number of rounds
and communicated bits). Proving security properties of shuffles traditionally
relied on proving the zero-knowledgeness of the underlying proof system.
In contrast, in [AW07] shuffles are precomputed with a random permuta-
tion and randomizers and published in public together with zero-knowledge
proofs. Although shuffling can be run in public, secret information used in
precomputing must be assumed to be kept secret. In order to find the pos-
sibility of removing the secret information that precomputing shuffles needs
to use, we consider homomorphic tallying since only public computation is
required for the anonymization process. Indeed, Benaloh and Yung [BY86]
proposed a Yes/No voting scheme using homomorphic tallying. However, ho-
momorphic tallying cannot recover the individual input plaintexts. This can
be problematic in some cases including write-in votes. One feasible solution
is to encode input messages into primes before encrypting them. However,
this way has two limitations: (1) The ciphertext space should be large; (2)
Recovering the original messages (e.g., by using factorization over Z) may
require exponential computation complexity. In this paper, we give verifiable
public shuffles that require only public computation, and support the original
message recovery in polynomial time.
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1.3 Cryptographic Shuffle Schemes
The idea of a shuffle was introduced by Chaum [Cha81] but he did not give
any method to guarantee the correctness. Many suggestions had been made
how to build mix-nets or prove the correctness of a shuffle since then, but
many of these approaches have been partially or fully broken, and the remain-
ing schemes sometimes suffer from other drawbacks. The scheme of Desmedt
and Kurosawa [DK00] assumed that only a small number of mix-servers are
corrupt. The approach of Jakobson, Juels, and Rivest [JJR02] needed a
relatively big number of mix-server to minimize the risk of tampering with
messages or compromising privacy of the senders. Peng et al. [PBDV04] re-
strained the class of possible permutations and also required that a part of
the senders are honest. None of these drawbacks are suffered by the shuf-
fle scheme of Wikström [Wik02] and approaches based on zero-knowledge
arguments.
Early contributions using zero-knowledge arguments were made by Sako
and Killian [SK95] and Abe [Abe98, Abe99, AH01]. Furukawa and Sako [FS01]
and Neff [Nef01, Nef03] proposed the first shuffles for ElGamal encryption
with a complexity that depends linearly on the number of ciphertexts. Fu-
rukawa and Sako’s approach is based on permutation matrices and has been
refined further [Fur05, GL07]. Furukawa, Miyachi, Mori, Obana and Sako [FMM+02]
presented an implementation of a shuffle argument based on permutation
matrices and tested it on mix-nets handling 100, 000 ElGamal ciphertexts.
Recently, Furukawa and Sako [FMS10] have reported on another implemen-
tation based on elliptic curve groups.
Wikström [Wik09] also used the idea of permutation matrices and sug-
gested a shuffle argument which splits in an offline and online phase. Fur-
thermore, Terelius and Wikström [TW10] constructed conceptually simple
4
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shuffle arguments that allowed the restriction of the shuffles to certain classes
of permutations. Both protocols are implemented in the Verificatum mix-net
library [Wik10].
Neff’s approach [Nef01] is based on the invariance of polynomials under
permutation of the roots. This idea was picked up by Groth who suggested
a perfect honest verifier zero-knowledge protocol [Gro10]. Stamer [Sta05]
reported on an implementation of this scheme. Later Groth and Ishai [GI08]
proposed the first shuffle argument where the communication complexity is
sublinear in the number of ciphertexts
The goal of shuffling in public is the public-key obfuscation of the shuffle
phase of a mix-net comprising either a decryption shuffle or re-encryption
shuffle functionality (program) [AW07]. Informally, a public-key obfuscator
O takes a program F and outputs a new program O(F) which outputs
encryptions of F ’s outputs. That is ∃ ,∀xO(F)  x = O(F(x)) for some
encryption function O and we say the operator  evaluates the obfuscated
program on input x. A formal model is proposed in Definition 3 [AW07] which
builds upon an earlier definition by Ostrovsky and Skeith [OS05]. Adida and
Wikström present obfuscators for decryption and re-encryption shuffles in
the BGN [BGN05] and Paillier [Pai99] cryptosystems respectively. They also
proved that their obfuscators are semantically secure (Definition 4 [AW07]).
Given a set of parties who sample and obfuscate a shuffle before any input




1.4 Contributions of This Work
This dissertation contributes to the practice and theory of cryptographic
shuffles, which are twofolds: (1) Definitions; (2) Concrete constructions.
Also, each contribution attempts to make cryptographic shuffles more useful
and realistic.
1.4.1 Our Definitional Approach
In [NSK04], the authors define a shuffle over a re-randomizable public-key
cryptosystem as a polynomial-time algorithm that takes a set of n input
ciphertexts and a random permutation, and outputs a set of n output ci-
phertexts. Other later definitions do not make a big difference from this.
As we will show later, this definition seems too restrictive to exploit all pos-
sibilities for achieving a construction that roughly corresponds to our goal.
Our definitional approach consists of two steps. First, we relax the restric-
tion that the number of output ciphertexts should be equal to that of input
ciphertexts. We call it generalized shuffle. Our interpretation of verifiable
secret shuffles is that they play a role of hiding the order of input ciphertexts
using a secret permutation and a fresh randomness. Our verifiable public
shuffles however remove the order of input ciphertexts itself. We formally
define this concept. Then, we formally describe what means by a secure
shuffle with respect to verifiability and unlinkability (in [NSK04] the authors
called it shuffle privacy).
1.4.2 Our Constructions
Our construction of verifiable public shuffles consists of two steps. First,
we show how construct a verifiable public shuffle from a ring homomorphic
6
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cryptosystem. We would like to stress that if we assume a ring homomorphic
cryptosystem, this construction is a more or less straightforward result, and
therefore may seem obvious in hindsight, but it is actually non-trivial as long
as a group homomorphic cryptosystem is concerned. Then, we show how to
construct public shuffle schemes from a group homomorphic cryptosystem.
Our idea is to use a homomorphic encryption Enc on a Unique Factoriza-
tion Domain (UFD) R and symmetric polynomials f1, . . . , f` ∈ R[x1, . . . , xn]
satisfying
fi(Encpk(m1), . . . ,Encpk(mn)) = Encpk(fi(m1, . . . ,mn))
for m1, . . . ,mn ∈ R. Given an n-tuple of ciphertexts (c1, . . . , cn) with ci =
Encpk(mi), our shuffle algorithm outputs fi(c1, . . . , cn) = Encpk(fi(m1, . . . ,mn))
for i = 1, . . . , `. This output is not a shuffle of (c1, . . . , cn), but plays the same
role with it, i.e. their decryption can be transformed into the set of origi-
nal messages {m1, . . . ,mn} using factorization on R[x], which is a UFD. It is
easy to see that this shuffle provides unlinkability between inputs and outputs
because a permutation of inputs does not result in changes of the output of
shuffle.
Using a ring homomorphic cryptosystem, we can construct a public shuf-
fle with O(1) ciphertext complexity in the number of senders. However,
ring homomorphic cryptosystems are highly expensive and not practical yet.
Thus, we construct public shuffles using a group homomorphic encryption–
ElGamal encryption, at the cost of O(n) ciphertext complexity. Note that
a basic public shuffle without relying on a trusted third party yields O(n2)
ciphertext complexity where n is the number of senders.
Our construction using a ring homomorphic encryption has O(`)(E +
D) +O(n2 log p)MFp computational complexity, where E, D, and MFp denote
the cost of encryption, decryption and multiplication in Fp, respectively.
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The construction using ElGamal encryption over Fp3 has O(n2 log p) MFp
computational complexity. In contrast, the Adida and Wikström scheme
requires O(n2) exponentiations to precompute and evaluate.
1.5 Organization
Chapter 2 reviews a number of cryptographic concepts important to shuffle
protocols, including public-key cryptography, homomorphic cryptosystems,
and public-key obfuscation. Chapter 3 reviews the legacy shuffle literature
with their formal definition, their security model, and several concrete in-
stantiations. Chapter 4 defines the concept of public shuffles, and their exact





Protocols for shuffles rely on numerous cryptographic building blocks. In this
chapter, we review the concepts and notation of these building blocks. We
begin with a review of public-key cryptography, its security definitions, and
the principal algorithms that we use in practical protocols. We review homo-
morphic cryptosystems, the interesting properties they yield, and the security
consequences of these properties. Then, we consider threshold cryptosystems,
where the process of key generation and decryption can be distributed among
trustees, a task of great importance to voting systems. We also review zero-
knowledge proofs, another critical component of universally verifiable voting,
and we briefly review program obfuscation, which is of particular importance
to understanding this dissertation.
2.1 Basics
For n ∈ N, [1, n] denotes the set {1, . . . , n}. If A is a probabilistic polynomial-
time (PPT) machine, we use a ← A to denote A which produces output




is used to denote sampling from the uniform distribution on U . For an integer




$←− X2(x1), . . . , xn
$←− Xn(x1, . . . , xn−1) : ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)]
to denote the probability that when x1 is drawn from a certain distribution
X1, and x2 is drawn from a certain distribution X2(x1), possibly depending
on the particular choice of x1, and so on, all the way to xn, the predicate
ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) is true.
A function g : N → R is negligible if for every positive polynomial µ(·)
there exists an integer N such that g(n) < 1/µ(n) for all n > N .
Let R(·, ·) be a polynomial-time computable relation in the size of its first
input. Associated with R, we consider a language LR = {x : ∃w such that R(x,w) =
1}. A proof system (P ,V) for a relation R allowing a prover P to prove that
a value x is in the associated language LR. The algorithm P that outputs a
proof Γ that Γ ∈ LR and the algorithm V that verifies the proof.
2.2 Public Key Encryption
Public-key encryption was first suggested by Diffie and Helman [DH76] in
1976, and first implemented by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman [RSA78] in
1978. At its core, it is a simple, though somewhat counter-intuitive, idea:
anyone can encrypt a message destined for Alice, but only Alice can decrypt
it. More precisely, Alice can generate a key pair composed of a public key
pk and a secret key sk . She then distributes pk publicly, but keeps sk to
herself. Using pk, Bob can encrypt a plaintext m into a ciphertext c. The
ciphertext c is then effectively “destined” for Alice, since only Alice possesses
sk , with which she can decrypt c back into m.
10
CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARIES
More formally, we can define a public-key cryptosystem as follows.
Definition 2.2.1. A public-key cryptosystem E is a 3-tuple of PPT algo-
rithms (KG,Enc,Dec) such that
1. The key generation algorithm KG takes as input the security parameter
λ and outputs a pair of keys (pk, sk). For given pk, the message space
Mpk and the randomness space Rpk are uniquely determined.
2. The encryption algorithm Enc takes as input a public key pk and a
message m ∈ Mpk, and outputs a ciphertext c ∈ Cpk where Cpk is a
finite set of ciphertexts. We write this as c←− Encpk(m). We sometimes
write Encpk(m) as Encpk(m, r) when the randomness r ∈ Rpk used by
Enc needs to be emphasized. .
3. The decryption algorithm Dec takes as input a private key sk and a
ciphertext c, and outputs a message m or a special symbol ⊥ which
means failure.
We say that a public-key cryptosystem E is correct if, for any key-pair
(pk, sk)←− KG(λ) and anym ∈Mpk, it is the case that: m← Decsk(Encpk(m)).
Given such a cryptosystem, one can consider different security definitions.
2.2.1 IND-CPA Security
Intuitively, a cryptosystem is said to be semantically secure if, given a ci-
phertext c, an adversary cannot determine any property of the underlying
plaintext m. In other words, an adversary cannot extract any semantic in-
formation of plaintext m from an encryption of m. Semantic security was
first defined in 1982 by Goldwasser and Micali [GM82], who also showed
that semantic security is equivalent to ciphertext indistinguishability with
11
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chosen plaintexts [GM84]. This latter definition, known as GM Security or
IND-CPA , is a more natural one, so we state it here.
In this definition, given a public key pk, the adversary chooses two plain-
texts m0 and m1 and is then presented with c, a ciphertext of one of these
plaintexts, chosen at random. If the adversary cannot guess which of the two
plaintexts was chosen for encryption with noticeably better than 50% chance
(i.e. picking one at random), then the scheme is said to be secure against
chosen plaintext attack.
Definition 2.2.2 ([GM84]). A public-key cryptosystem E = (KG,Enc,Dec)
with a security parameter λ is called to be semantically secure (IND-CPA
secure) if after the standard CPA game being played with any PPT adversary
A = (A1,A2), the advantage AdvcpaE,A(λ), formally defined as∣∣∣∣∣∣Prb,r
 (pk, sk)←− KG(λ), (state,m0,m1)←− A1(pk),




is negligible in λ for all sufficiently large λ.
We know of a number of efficient schemes that are IND-CPA-secure.
El Gamal. El Gamal [El 84] is the prime example of an IND-CPA-secure
cryptosystem. Consider g the generator of a q-order subgroup of Z×p , where
p is prime and q is a large prime factor of p − 1. Key generation involves
selecting a random x ∈ Z×q , at which point sk = x and pk = y = gx (mod p).
Encryption is then given as
c = (α, β) = (gr,m · yr), r $←− Z×q .







Paillier. Paillier [Pai99] is another good example of an IND-CPA-secure
cryptosystem. Consider n = pq as in the RSA setting. Consider λ = lcm(p−
1, q − 1). Consider the function L(x) = (x − 1)/n. Consider a generator g
of Z×n2 specially formed such that g = 1 (mod n). The public key is then
simply n, while the private key is λ. Encryption of m ∈ Zn is performed as
c = gmrn (mod n)2 for a random r





We provide here a brief explanation of the Paillier cryptosystem, given
that it is particularly interesting and useful for our work in this dissertation.
Recall that:
– ϕ(n) = (p− 1)(q − 1) is Euler’s totient function
– λ = lcm(p− 1, q − 1) is the output of Carmichael’s function on n
– The order of Z×n2 is nϕ(n)
– For any a ∈ Z×n2 :
– aλ ≡ 1 mod n
– aλn ≡ 1 mod n2
Thus, consider the decryption function defined above, in particular the de-
nominator. Recall that g = 1 mod n, which we can also write g = nα + 1
for some integer α.
L(gλ mod n2) =





≡ αλ mod n2
13
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Note that the exponentiation above reduces to the multiplication because all
other monomials in the expansion are multiples of n2. One can then easily
see that, because rn will cancel out by exponentiation to λ:
L(cλ mod n2) ≡ mαλ mod n2
and thus that the decryption works as specified.
2.2.2 IND-CCA Security
Indistinguishability with respect to adaptively-chosen plaintexts is not enough
for all applications. Intuitively, one should also consider the possibility that
the adversary can obtain the decryption of a few chosen ciphertexts before
receiving the challenge ciphertext. This notion of security is called IND-
CCA-security, informally known as “security against lunchtime attacks.” The
model is that the adversary might have access to a decryption box while the
owner is “out to lunch” (possibly metaphorically.) Later, the adversary will
try to use the information gained over lunch to decrypt other ciphertexts.
Definition 2.2.3. labeldef-indcca1 A public-key cryptosystem E = (KG,Enc,Dec)
with a security parameter λ is is said to be IND-CCA-secure given a decryp-
tion oracle OD: if after the standard CCA game being played with any PPT
adversary A = (A1,A2), the advantage AdvccaE,A(λ), formally defined as∣∣∣∣∣∣Prb,r
 (pk, sk)←− KG(λ), (state,m0,m1)←− AOD1 (pk),




is negligible in λ for all sufficiently large λ.
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2.3 Homomorphic Public-key Encryption
Homomorphic public-key cryptosystems exhibit a particularly interesting al-
gebraic property: when two ciphertexts are combined in a specific, publicly-
computable fashion, the resulting ciphertext encodes the combination of the
underlying plaintexts under a specific group operation, usually multiplication
or addition.
Definition 2.3.1. A group homomorphic cryptosystem is a public-key cryp-
tosystem (KG,Enc,Dec) where the set of possible messages Mpk and the set of
possible ciphertexts Cpk are both groups such that for any public key pk and
any two ciphertexts c1 ∈ Encpk(m1), c2 ∈ Encpk(m2), the following condition
holds:
Decsk(c1 · c2) = m1 ·m2
where · represents the respective group operations in Cpk and Mpk. When
additive notation is used, Decsk(c1 + c2) = m1 +m2.
We can easily define a homomorphic encryption scheme with a re-randomization
algorithm using a similar way above.
Definition 2.3.2. A ring homomorphic cryptosystem is a public-key cryp-
tosystem where the set of possible messages Mpk and the set of possible
ciphertexts Cpk are both rings such that for any public key pk and any two
ciphertexts c1 ∈ Encpk(m1), c2 ∈ Encpk(m2), the following conditions hold:
1. Decsk(c1 + c2) = m1 +m2
2. Decsk(c1 · c2) = m1 ·m2




An immediate consequence of a cryptosystem’s homomorphic property is its
ability to perform re-randomization: given a ciphertext c, anyone can create
a different ciphertext c that encodes the same plaintext as c. Recall that E
is homomorphic for addition if (Mpk,+) forms a group, which means there
exists an identity plaintext m0 such that, ∀m ∈ Mpk,m + m0 = m. Thus,
given a homomorphic cryptosystem E , we can define the re-randomization
algorithm as follows:
ReRandpk(c; r) = c · Encpk(m0; r)
If Decsk(c) = m, then Decsk(ReRandpk(c)) = m, too.
For a public-key encryption scheme E = (KG,Enc,Dec) with an addi-
tional randomized algorithm ReRand that, on input a ciphertext outputs a
new ciphertext with the same message, a given adversary A = (A1,A2), let




(pk, sk)←− KG(λ), (state, c)←− A1(pk),
ĉ =




We say that the public-key encryption scheme is re-randomizable if for all
PPT algorithms A, the advantage in the game above is negligible in λ.
Security of Homomorphic Cryptosystems
The malleability of ciphertexts in homomorphic cryptosystems limits the se-
curity of such schemes. In particular, the ability to re-randomization imme-
diately indicates that the system is not IND-CCA2-secure, and can be at best
IND-RCCA-secure. Even more significant, the ability to create a ciphertext
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of a related but different plaintext breaks even IND-RCCA security. Specifi-
cally, an adversary can take the challenge ciphertext c, create c = c·Encpk(m̄)
for some m̄ known to the adversary, query OD with c to obtain m, and com-
pute m = m+ m̄− 1. It has not been known whether homomorphic schemes
can be IND-CCA-secure, but in 1991, Damg̊ard proposed what we will call
the Damg̊ard’s Elgamal (DEG) cryptosystem [Dam91]. DEG is a relatively
straightforward modification of Elgamal that employs an additional exponen-
tiation to reject “invalid” ciphertexts. DEG was proven to be CCA1-secure
under a nonfalsifiable knowledge-of-the-exponent assumption [Nao03].
Homomorphic Schemes in Practice
A number of practical schemes are homomorphic.
RSA. In raw RSA, encryption is performed as c = me mod n. Thus,
clearly, c0 · c1 = (m0 · m1)e mod n. Raw RSA is thus homomorphic on
operation ·. That said, raw RSA is not even IND-CPA-secure, which means
it is not very useful in many applications. RSA-OAEP, on the other hand, is
quite useful, but loses the homomorphic property due to the non-malleable
OAEP padding.
El Gamal. In El Gamal, encryption is performed as c = (gr,m ·yr). Thus,
if we define × as the element-wise product of ciphertext pairs, then El Gamal
is homomorphic for ×:
(gr1 ,m1 · yr1)× (gr2 ,m2 · yr2) =
(
gr1+r2 , (m1m2) · yr1+r2
)
.




Paillier. In Paillier, encryption is performed as c = gmrn mod n2. Clearly,
this scheme is homomorphic for + over the plaintext space Zn:
Encpk(m1, r1) · Encpk(m2, r2) = (gm1rn1 ) · (gm2rn2 )
= gm1+m2(r1r2)
n
= Encpk(m1 +m2, r1r2).
Note that Paillier decryption is efficient, which means the plaintext do-
main can be superpolynomial while retaining the additive homomorphism.
2.4 Zero-Knowledge Proofs
A major component of verifiable voting protocols is the zero-knowledge proof.
In a zeroknowledge proof, a prover P interacts with a verifier V to demon-
strate the validity of an assertion, e.g., “ciphertext c under public key pk
decrypts to ‘I am Sim’.” If the prover is honest—i.e. the assertion is true—
then the verifier should accept this proof. If the prover is dishonest—i.e., the
assertion is false—then the verifier should reject this proof with noticeable
probability. Finally, the verifier should learn nothing more than the truth
of the assertion. In particular, the verifier should be unable to turn around
and perform this same (or similar) proof to a third party. The notion of
“zero-knowledge” is tricky to define: how can one capture the concept that
no knowledge has been transferred? The accepted approach is to look at
the verifier and see if its participation in the proof protocol bequeathed it
any new capability. The protocol is zero-knowledge if, no matter what the
verifier outputs after the protocol, it could have produced the very same
output without interacting with the prover. Thus, though the verifier may
be personally convinced from its interaction that the prover’s assertion is
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indeed true, the verifier is unable to relay any new information convincingly,
in particular he cannot perform the proof on his own.
The prover’s assertion is formally defined as “x is in language L,” where
x is a string, and L is a language, usually an NP language. Thus, the prover
P is given x and a witness w for x such that R(x,w) = 1, where R is the
binary relation for language L. The verifier V only gets x as input, of course.
The zero-knowledge property of the protocol ensures that the witness w, and
in fact any non-trivial function of the witness, remains hidden from V .
Definition 2.4.1 (Perfect Zero-Knowledge Proof). An interactive protocol
(P ,V) for language L is defined as a perfect zero-knowledge proof if there
exists a negligible function ν(·) such that the protocol has the following
properties:
– Completeness: ∀x ∈ L,Pr[(P ,V)(x,w) = 1] > 1− ν(λ).
– Soundness: ∀P∗,∀x /∈ L,Pr[(P∗,V) = 1] < 1
2
.
– Zero-Knowledge: ∃ PPT S,∀V∗,∀x ∈ L, S(x) ≈ (P ,V∗)(x,w)
2.4.1 Zero-Knowledge Variants
A few variants of this definition exist:
– Computational Zero-Knowledge (CZK): The verifier V , and thus
the dishonest version V∗, are probabilistic polynomial-time. In other
words, a surprisingly powerful verifier might be able to extract some
knowledge from an execution of a CZK protocol.
– Zero-Knowledge Argument: The prover P is assumed to be com-
putationally constrained, i.e., it is a PPT algorithm. This setting must
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be considered with care, as the PPT limitation is dependent on the
security parameter λ, but P may spend significant time preparing for
the protocol execution.
– Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge (HVZK): The verifier V is ex-
pected to perform according to the protocol. In particular, as the
verifier is usually expected to submit a random challenge to the prover,
an honest verifier will always flip coins when picking a challenge and
will never base his challenge on the prover’s messages. The result of an
HVZK assumption is that the simulation proof can focus on simulat-
ing a transcript of the interaction, rather than simulating anything V
could output. An HVZK protocol can be turned into a non-interactive
zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof using the Fiat- Shamir heuristic [FS87],
where the verifier’s random messages are generated using a hash func-
tion applied to the prior protocol messages. This hash function must
be modeled as random oracle, which has recently caused some concern
in the theoretical cryptography community [GT03].
Zero-knowledge proofs play a big role in verifiable shuffle protocols, where
each sender must prove that it performed its designated action correctly while
preserving shuffler’s privacy. As the integrity of the shuffler takes prece-
dence over his privacy, it can be immediately said that computational zero-
knowledge proofs will be preferable to zero-knowledge arguments.
2.4.2 Proof of Knowledge
Certain zero-knowledge proofs provide an additional property that is partic-
ularly useful in proving overall protocol security: they prove knowledge of the
witness, not just existence. In particular, this means that, given rewindable,
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black-box access to the prover program P , one can extract a witness w to
the assertion that x ∈ L. More formally, we define a zero-knowledge proof
of knowledge as follows.
Definition 2.4.2 (Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge). An interactive pro-
tocol (P ,V) for a language L is defined as a zero-knowledge proof of knowl-
edge if the protocol is zero-knowledge and it has the following, additional
property:
– Extraction: ∃ PPT E ,∀ (x,w) ∈ R, EP(x,w)() = w. By EP(x,w), we
mean that we take the prover program P , provide it with inputs (x,w),
and give the extractor Enc black-box access to this initialized prover
program, allowing the extractor to rewind, reply, and provide continu-
ing inputs to P .
A proof-of-knowledge protocol can be particularly useful in the context of
reduction proofs, since the extraction property allows a simulator to get the
witness and use it in the reduction process. A zero-knowledge proof without
extractability is much more difficult to integrate into a complete protocol
security proof.
2.5 Public-Key Obfuscation
Ostrovsky and Skeith [OS05] proposed a slightly different and weaker model
of obfuscation, where the outputs of the obfuscated program are encrypted
versions of the outputs of the original, unobfuscated program. In other words,
their technique allows for outsourcing most of a computation, but not all of it:
a final decryption is still required after the obfuscated program has been exe-
cuted. They name this model public-key obfuscation. Interestingly, because
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the outputs of a public-key-obfuscated program are encrypted, Ostrovsky and
Skeith’s definition is able to capture the additional notion of security missing
from the Barak et al. and Tauman-Kalai and Goldwasser definitions: out-
put indistinguishability. Informally, a public-key obfuscator is secure when
an adversary cannot distinguish between the public-key obfuscations of two
programs it selected. We now provide a more formal definition.
Definition 2.5.1. A program class is a family {Pλ}λ∈N of sets of programs
such that there exists a polynomial s(·) such that |P | ≤ s(λ) for every p ∈ Pλ.
The program class is said to be PPT if, for every λ ∈ N , for every p ∈ Pλ,
P runs in probabilistic polynomial time in λ.
Definition 2.5.2 (Public-Key Obfuscation). The algorithmO is a public-key
obfuscator for the program class {Pλ} and the cryptosystem E = (KG,Enc,Dec)
if:
– Correctness: there exist a negligible function ν(·) such that, for every
λ ∈ N, for every P ∈ Pλ, for all inputs x:
Pr[Decsk(O(P )(x, r)) = P (x)] > 1− ν(λ)
taken over the choice of r, an extra input which parameterizes the
execution of O(P ).
– Conciseness: there is a polynomial l(·) such that, for every λ ∈ N and
for every P ∈ Pλ,
|O(P )| ≤ l(|P |).
Now, we must describe what it means for this public-key obfuscator to
be secure. Ostrovsky and Skeith give an indistinguishability-based defini-
tion. Thus, consider first the indistinguishability experiment. Informally, we
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first generate a keypair. Based on the public key, the adversary selects two
programs from the program class. We obfuscate one of the two, selected at
random, and we ask the adversary to guess which one was obfuscated. We
now formalize this intuition, which is much like the semantic security for





(P0, P1, state)← A1(pk);
b′ ← A2(O(1λ, pk, sk, Pb), state)
If P0, P1 ∈ Pλ return b′, otherwise a random bit.
We can now define the security property we seek from a public-key ob-
fuscator.
Definition 2.5.3 (Secure Public-Key Obfuscation). A public-key obfuscator
O for a program class with respect to a cryptosystem E = (KG,Enc,Dec) is
secure, or polynomially indistinguishable, if there exists a negligible function
ν(·) such that:
∣∣Expind0P,O,E,A(λ)− Expind1P,O,E,A(λ)∣∣ < ν(λ).
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Verifiable Secret Shuffles: A
Review
3.1 Introduction
Consider a set of senders, each with a private message, who wish to gen-
erate a shuffled list of these messages, while keeping the permutation se-
cret. Protocols that implement this functionality were first introduced by
Chaum [Cha81] in 1981, who called them mix-nets. There are many differ-
ent types of mix-nets, and many different definitions and constructions.
Non-cryptographic mixnets tend to mix inputs more or less synchronously
for low-latency applications such as anonymized web browsing [DMS04].
These mixnets generally focus on achieving some level of privacy, without
usually worrying about robustness: if a few mix servers drop or otherwise
corrupt messages, the impact on the application is generally not horrible: a
sender can simply retry using a different set of mix servers.
By contrast, robust mixnets handle applications like voting, which have
significantly different requirements. On the one hand, they provide far more
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flexibility: mixing can take hours or, in some cases, even days, because shuf-
fling is performed in large, well-defined batches, with no need for real-time
responses. On the other hand, the correctness requirements are much more
stringent: inputs should not be lost or altered, in some cases even when
all mix servers are corrupt. The privacy of the shuffle permutation is also
important, and should be provably–not just heuristically–protected.
In this chapter, we review the past 25 years of literature on verifiable
shuffles. We note that this area of research has been quite productive, with
numerous directions explored, and fascinating techniques developed to im-
prove efficiency. The security definitions have evolved. In short, shuffles have
been a fertile area of research.
3.2 Notation and Definitions
Firstly, we rephrase the formal definition of a verifiable shuffle given by
Nguyen et al. [NSK04, Def. 4], In [NSK04] they extensively use a re-randomizable
public-key encryption scheme. We do not construct a secret verifiable shuffle,
but we also rely on the re-randomization property of an encryption scheme
with semantic security. We additionally introduce some notation used to de-
fine public verifiability. We then extend it to the definition of a generalized
shuffle.
Let E = (KG,Enc,Dec,ReRand) be an encryption scheme with a re-
randomization algorithm satisfying semantic security. Let c, ĉ be two lists
of ciphertexts, but all elements of each list belong to the ciphertext space
Cpk defined in E . We use Σn to denote the set of all permutations on [1, n].
For a set X = {a1, . . . , an}, we denote by |X| the number of elements in the
set, i.e., |X| = n. Let Φ(·, ·) be an efficient shuffle relation that holds if the
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witness w =
(
π, s1, . . . , s|c|
)
demonstrates that |c| = |ĉ| and
∃
(
π, s1, . . . , s|c|
)
,∀ i ∈ [1, |c|] : ĉπ(i) = ReRandpk(ci, sj) for some j ∈ [1, |c|]
(3.2.1)
where δ is a public parameter including pk, π ∈ Σ|c|, ci ∈ c, and ĉπ(i) ∈ ĉ. As-
sociated with Φ, we define a language LΦ = {x = (δ, c, ĉ) : ∃w such that Φ(x,w) =
1}.
Definition 3.2.1 (Verifiable Shuffle). A verifiable shuffle scheme ΦE over
a re-randomizable public-key cryptosystem E = (KG,Enc,Dec,ReRand) is a
triple of PPT algorithms (Setup, Shuffle,Verify) which works as follows:
– δ ← Setup(λ, n) : The setup algorithm takes as input a security param-
eter λ and n ∈ N, and outputs a public parameter δ := (pk,Σn) where
pk ←− KG(1λ).
– (ĉ,Γ)← Shuffle(δ, w, c) : First the shuffle algorithm generates a random
permutation π ∈ Σn and a list of randomness (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ (Rpk)n,
and sets the secret parameter w = (π, s1, . . . , sn). Using the public
parameter δ and it secret parameter w, the shuffle algorithm encodes
a list of ciphertexts c = (c1, . . . , cn) as a shuffled set of ciphertexts




for some i ∈ [1, n]





forms a proof Γ for the shuffle performed by the shuffler in possession
of π
$←− Σn and a list of randomness {s1, . . . , sn}.
– {accept, reject} ← Verify(δ, c, ĉ,Γ) : The verification algorithm takes as
input the public parameter δ, two lists of ciphertexts c, ĉ and a proof
Γ, and checks the validity of the proof by running (P ,V)(δ, c, ĉ,Γ); if
this fails output reject and otherwise output accept.
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When the shuffle algorithm requires the secret parameter in order to
output a permuted and re-randomized version of input ciphertexts, we call
it secret shuffle. If the verification algorithm does not requires any secret
parameter, we call it (publicly) verifiable shuffle. Thus, if a secret parameter
w is not empty but Verify does not take it as input, we call this type of shuffle
schemes a publicly verifiable secret shuffle scheme, shortly a secret shuffle.
We remark that decryption shuffles also belong to secret shuffle because they
use a random secret permutation in shuffling.
3.3 Security
There are two security requirements. Privacy requires an honest shuffle to
protect its secret permutation whereas verifiability requires that any attempt
by a malicious shuffle to produce an incorrect output must be detectable.
3.3.1 Verifiability for Secret Shuffles
We rephrase the verifiability condition for secret shuffles in our language.
The reader is encouraged to refer to [NSK04] for in-depth discussions on the
verifiability condition of shuffles.
Definition 3.3.1 ([NSK04]). Let a set of algorithms (P ,V) be a proof system
for an efficient shuffle relation Φ with associated language LΦ. A shuffle
scheme ΦE = (Setup, Shuffle,Verify) is verifiable if its proof system (P ,V) has
an efficient algorithm V and satisfies completeness and soundness below.
1. Completeness. For all x = (δ, c, ĉ) ∈ LΦ, (P ,V)(x,Γ) = 1 for all proofs
Γ← P(x,w) where δ ← Setup(λ, n, `).
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2. Soundness. For all PPT A and for δ ← Setup(λ, n, `), the probability
that A(λ, n, `, δ) outputs (x,Γ) such that x 6∈ LΦ but (A,V)(x,Γ) = 1,
is negligible in the security parameter λ.
3.3.2 Unlinkability Experiments
One definition for security of a secret shuffle ΦE = (Setup, Shuffle,Verify)
is indistinguishability against chosen permutation attack (CPAΣ), which is
analogous to indistinguishability against chosen plaintext attack in public-
key cryptosystems [NSK04]. Nguyen et al. [NSK04] proposed a different
definition called semantic privacy against CPAΣ, but they showed that the
two notions are eventually equivalent.
For a proof system, we use ViewP,V(x) to denote all that V can see from
the execution of the proof system on input x.
Definition 3.3.2 (Unlinkability in [NSK04]). Let ΦE = (Setup, Shuffle,Verify)
be a secret shuffle scheme.
Experiment ExpShuffleA (ΦE , λ)
δ ← Setup(λ, n);
(π0, π1, c)← A(δ, n) where πi ∈ Σn for i = 1, 2;




ĉ,ViewP,V(δ, c, ĉ,Γ), c, {mi}ni=1, {ri}ni=1
)
where ci = Encpk(mi, ri);
b′ ← A(δ, v);
In the experiment above, we define the advantage of an adversary A, running
in probabilistic polynomial time and making a polynomial number of queries,
as:
AdvShuffleA (ΦE , λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[b = b′]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
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A verifiable secret shuffle scheme is unlikable if
AdvShuffleA (ΦE , λ) ≤ negl(λ)
where negl(·) is a negligible function of its input.
For a secret shuffle, we describe a variant of the unlinkability notion
against the chosen random attack.
Definition 3.3.3 (Unlinkability for a Secret Shuffle). Let ΦE = (Setup, Shuffle,Verify)
be a generalized secret shuffle scheme.
Experiment ExpShuffleA (ΦE , λ)
δ ← Setup(λ, n, `);
(r0, r1, c)← A(δ, n, `) where ri = (ri1, . . . , ri`) for i = 1, 2;




ĉ,ViewP,V(δ, c, ĉ,Γ), c, {mi}ni=1, {ri}ni=1
)
where ci = Encpk(mi, ri);
b′ ← A(δ, ν);
In the experiment above, we define the advantage of an adversary A, running
in probabilistic polynomial time and making a polynomial number of queries,
as:
AdvShuffleA (ΦE , λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[b = b′]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
A secret shuffle scheme is unlikable if the advantage AdvShuffleA (ΦE , λ) is neg-
ligible in the security parameter λ.
3.4 Selected Prior Work
As mentioned above, there are numerous prior work we have to pay attention
to. However, in this section we just review two selected work. The reason
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is why the Furukawa-Sako scheme [FS01] is the first verifiable, efficient, and
secure shuffle scheme, and the Groth scheme [Gro03] is the most efficient.
3.4.1 Furukawa-Sako Protocol
Represent the permutation πj by the permutation matrix M
j , with M jab = 1
if and only if πj(a) = b, and M
j
ab = 0, otherwise. A nice way of using this
matrix representation to achieve efficient zero-knowledge proofs is described
in [FS01, Fur05]. It is based on the next fact [FS01]: Let δij be 1 if i = j
and 0 otherwise. Let δijk be 1 if i = j = k and 0 otherwise. Let q be a large
prime. An n× n matrix M is a permutation matrix if and only if∑
h
MhiMhj = δij (3.4.2)
and ∑
h
MhiMhjMhk = δijk. (3.4.3)











and that Eq. (3.4.2) and Eq. (3.4.3) are true.
Equation (3.4.2) can be verified by defining si =
∑n
i=1Mjiej, for ej chosen


























CHAPTER 3. VERIFIABLE SECRET SHUFFLES: A REVIEW








Some more care has to be taken to achieve complete security [FS01, Fur05].
In this approach, the prover must make approximately 8n exponentia-
tions, and the verifier must make approximately 10n exponentiations. When
‖p‖= 1024 and ‖q‖= 160, it takes about 5280n bits to communicate the
proof of knowledge.
3.4.2 Groth Protocol
An alternative, somewhat more efficient, verifiable shuffle was proposed by
Groth [Gro03]. It assumes the use of an IND-CPA secure homomorphic
cryptosystem (e.g., ElGamal, Paillier, or Damg̊ard and Jurik [DJ01]), and
of a compatible homomorphic commitment scheme. In this verifiable shuffle,
the prover first commits to the shuffle. The verifier picks a vector of random
integers, and the prover proves that the scalar product of this vector and the
vector of encrypted votes is preserved after the shuffling.
Commitment Schemes. A commitment scheme is a function com : X ×
R → Y from the plaintext space X and random coin space R to the com-
mitment space Y . A commitment scheme com is (a) statistically hiding if
the commitment y = com(m, r) leaks a statistically insignificant amount of
information about the plaintext m and the coin r; and (b) computation-
ally binding if given commitment y = com(m, r) to some element r from
the plaintext space, it is hard to find m′ ∈ Mpk,m′ 6= m, and an r′, s.t.
y = com(m′, r′). For the best known commitment schemes (e.g., Peder-
sen’s [Ped91]), the plaintext space is equal to ZN for some N . Therefore,
com(m, r) = com(m+N, r) and therefore, such commitment schemes are not
binding over the integers.
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Groth’s Verifiable Shuffle. In more details, Groth’s verifiable shuffle is
as follows:
– Prover: For j = {1, . . . , n}, commit to commit to C1,i ← compk(π(j), r2,j).
Send C1,i, together with a proof of correct shuffle, to verifier.
– Verifier: For j = {1, . . . , n}, generate a random tj and send tj to prover.
– Prover: For j = {1, . . . , n}, C2,i ← compk(tπ(j), rtj). Send {C1,i}i,
together with a proof of correct shuffle and that this shuffle was the
same as on Step 1, to verifier.











The three first proofs of knowledge can be executed jointly, by proving
that for a random γ chosen by the verifier, {C1,iCγ2,i} commits to {i + γti}.
The proof that {ci} commits to {mi} can be done as follows: Prover sets
cm = compk(m; 0), for m generated by the verifier, and proves that the mul-
tiplication of the contents of c1c
−1
m , . . . , cnc
−1
m is equal to
∏n
i=1(mi − m) All
(or at least a significant fraction) of the resulting voters zero-knowledge mul-
tiplication proofs can be done in parallel by using multi-commitments.
In this approach, the prover must perform approximately 6n exponen-
tiations, and the verifier must perform approximately 6n exponentiations.
When ‖p‖= 1024 and ‖q‖= 160, it takes about 1184n bits to communicate
the proof of knowledge.
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3.5 Public Shuffles with Private Permutation
3.5.1 Introduction
The goal of shuffling in public is the public-key obfuscation of the shuffle
phase of a mix-net comprising either a decryption shuffle or re-encryption
shuffle functionality (program) [AW07]. Informally, a public-key obfuscator
O takes a program F and outputs a new program O(F) which outputs
encryptions of F’s outputs. That is ∃ ,∀xO(F)  x = O(F(x)) for some
encryption function O and we say the operator  evaluates the obfuscated
program on input x. A formal model is proposed in Definition 3 [AW07] which
builds upon an earlier definition by Ostrovsky and Skeith [OS05]. Adida and
Wikström present obfuscators for decryption and re-encryption shuffles in
the BGN [BGN05] and Paillier [Pai99] cryptosystems respectively. They also
prove that their obfuscators are semantically secure (Definition 4 [AW07]).
Given a set of parties who sample and obfuscate a shuffle before any input
is received, one can construct a mix-net provided that joint decryption is
verifiable.
3.5.2 Adida and Wikström Protocol
Adida and Wikström [AW07] proposed two schemes shuffling in public allow
a shuffle to be precomputed. These schemes imply that no mix servers need
be present at election time for mixing to take place. One downside of their
schemes is that the scheme significantly restricts the number and size of votes.
Additionally the main disadvantage of shuffling in public is its inefficiency,
with generation and evaluation of the precomputed shuffle requiring O(n2)
exponentiations.
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The BGN Cryptosystem
We denote the BGN cryptosystem by E = (KG,Enc,Dec). It operates in
two groups G1 and G2 both of order n = q1q2, where q1 and q2 are distinct
prime integers. We use multiplicative notation in both G1 and G2, and
denote by g a generator in G1. The groups G1 and G2 exhibit a polynomial-
time computable bilinear map e : G1 × G1 → G2 such that G = e(g, g)
generates G2. Bilinearity implies that ∀u, v ∈ G1 and ∀ a, b ∈ Z, e(ua, vb) =
e(u, v)ab. We refer the reader to [BGN05] for details on how such groups
can be generated and on the cryptosystem’s properties, which we briefly
summarize here.
Key generation. On input 1λ, KG generates (q1, q2,G1, g,G2, e(·, ·)) as above
such that n = q1q2 is a λ-bit integer. It chooses u ∈ G1 randomly, de-
fines h = uq2 , and outputs a public key pk = (n,G1,G2, e(·, ·), g, h)
and secret key sk = q1.
Encryption. On input pk and m, Enc selects r ∈ Zn randomly and outputs
c = gmhr.
Decryption. On input sk = q1 and c ∈ G1, Dec outputs loggq1 (cq1).
Homomorphisms. The BGN cryptosystem is additively homomorphic.
This scheme needs this property, but this scheme also exploits its one-time
multiplicative homomorphism implemented by the bilinear map:
e(Encpk(m0, r0),Encpk(m1, r1)) = Encpk(m0m1,m0r1 +m1r0 + (logg u)q2r0r1)
The result is a ciphertext in G2 which cannot be efficiently converted back to
an equivalent ciphertext in G1. Thus, the multiplicative homomorphism can
be evaluated only once, after which only homomorphic additions are possible.
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For notational clarity, we write c1⊕ c2 := c1c2 for ciphertexts in G1 or G2
and c1 ⊗ c2 := e(c1, c2) for ciphertexts in G1.
BGN-based Scheme
The first obfuscator is based on the fact that matrix multiplication only
requires an arithmetic circuit with multiplication depth 1. Thus, the BGN
cryptosystem can be used for homomorphic matrix multiplication. Consider
an n1×n2-matrix C = (cij) = Encpk(aij) and an n2×n3-matrix C ′ = (djk) =
Encpk(bjk), and let A = (aij) and B = (bjk). Define homomorphic matrix
multiplication by
















We use the additive homomorphism and the special homomorphic property
exhibited above to define a form of homomorphic matrix multiplication of
matrices of ciphertexts. Given an n-permutation matrix Λπ = (λπij) and






where EncN3 denotes Paillier’s cryptosystem using modulus N
3 and EncN3
denotes that using modulus N2. We define a kind of matrix multiplication
of d = (d1, . . . , dn) ∈ CnN2 and Cπ:













In this chapter, we describe a method to construct a public shuffle without re-
lying on permutations and randomizers generated privately: Given an n-tuple
of ciphertext (c1, . . . , cn), our shuffle algorithm computes fi(c1, . . . , cn) for
i = 1, . . . , ` where each fi(x1, . . . , xn) is a symmetric polynomial in x1, . . . , xn.
Depending on the symmetric polynomials we use, we propose two concrete
constructions. One is to use ring homomorphic encryption with constant ci-
phertext complexity and the other is to use simple ElGamal encryption with
linear ciphertext complexity in the number of senders. Both constructions
are free of zero-knowledge proofs and publicly verifiable.
4.1 Introduction
Given n distinct elements, (m1, . . . ,mn), from each sender, a shuffle is an
n-party functionality that allows all users to learn
⋃n
i=1{mi}, but does not
reveal any information on link between mi and its sender without negligible
probability. Shuffles can be used in various applications including e-voting
and private set union ensured to hide the link between messages and their
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senders. A Chaumian mix-net consists of multiple mix-servers which have
their private permutation and randomness. If a mix-net consists of a single
mix-server, then the mix-server knows who sent what message. Thus, there
must be at least one honest mix-server in a mix-net.
However, the assumption that there exists an honest mix-server (a.k.a.,
a trusted third party) in real life, may be quite strong. Thus many re-
searchers have focused on strengthening verifiability in Chaum’s construc-
tion (e.g., [FS01, Nef01, Nef03, Fur05, Wik05, GL07]). Their goal is to ef-
ficiently enforce each mix-server to behave as being in public even though
each mix-server should keep his permutation and randomizers secret. When a
shuffle allows public verifiability, in general, by using zero-knowledge proofs,
but requires a secret permutation and randomizers, Neff [Nef01] (and later
Groth [Gro10]) call it a verifiable secret shuffle.
In TCC 2007, Adida and Wikström [AW07] proposed a way by which
mix-servers carry out shuffling in public. Their work is based on the no-
tion of public-key obfuscation studied by Ostrovsky and Skeith [OS05] for
different purposes. Very informally, their basic idea is that mix-servers pre-
compute their private permutation and then publish it in public. Though
secret information is concealed by a homomorphic cryptosystem such as the
BGN cryptosystem [BGN05] and the Paillier cryptosystem [Pai99], it should
be generated by a trusted party. Thus, we call their work a public shuffle
with a private permutation. In this paper, we will try to construct a verifiable
public shuffle without a private permutation.
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4.2 Generalized Shuffle
4.2.1 Syntax of Generalized Shuffle
Now we describe the syntax of a generalized shuffle.
As a symmetry of verifiable secret shuffles, it is not difficult to make
the definition of publicly verifiable public shuffle or public shuffle for short.
Namely, public shuffle is a publicly verifiable shuffle scheme such that its
shuffle algorithm also does not require any secret parameter. However, it
is not easy to design and construct a public shuffle scheme following Defi-
nition 3.2.1. Although Adida et al. [AW07] and Parampalli et al. [PRT12]
achieve public shuffle by utilizing the public-key obfuscation technique, se-
cret parameters in their schemes are required in the setup algorithm instead
of the shuffle algorithm. To remove dependencies on secret parameters in a
shuffle scheme, we first consider how to construct a secret shuffle without a
secret permutation as a intermediate step toward public shuffle. However,
we observed that it is difficult to achieve a secret shuffle without requiring
a secret permutation under the legacy definition. Hence, we will relax the
shuffle definition above in order to realize the notion of public shuffle. In
particular, it is worth noting it has been a long standing hard problem to
design a secure shuffle protocol without relying on TTP.
Definition 4.2.1 (Generalized Shuffle). Let E = (KG,Enc,Dec,ReRand) be
a re-randomizable public-key cryptosystem with semantic security. A gener-
alized shuffle scheme Φ̃E over E is a triple of PPT algorithms as defined in
Definition 3.2.1 except for
– δ ← Setup(λ, n, `) : The setup algorithm takes as input a security
parameter λ and parameters n, ` ∈ N, and outputs a public parameter
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where pk ←− KG(1λ), σj : (Cpk)n → Cpk,
and Ti : (Mpk)
` →Mpk.
– (ĉ,Γ) ← Shuffle(δ, w, c) : The shuffle algorithm takes as input a pair
of parameters (δ, w) and a list of ciphertexts c = (c1, . . . , cn) where
ci ∈ Encpk(mi), and outputs a set of ciphertexts ĉ = {ĉ1, . . . , ĉ`} where
ĉj = ReRandpk (σj(c1, . . . , cn), r̂j)) along with a proof Γ, satisfying
Decsk(ci) = Ti′ (Decsk(ĉ1), . . . ,Decsk(ĉ`))
for some i, i′ ∈ [1, n], j ∈ [1, `].
A generalized shuffle scheme is correct if for all messages mi ∈Mpk and
any n, ` ∈ N, there exists each transformation Ti : (Mpk)` →Mpk such that
{T1 (Decsk(ĉ1), . . . ,Decsk(ĉ`)) , . . . ,Tn (Decsk(ĉ1), . . . ,Decsk(ĉ`))}
= {m1, . . . ,mn}
= {Decsk(c1), . . . ,Decsk(cn)}.
(4.2.1)
In the above definition, if we choose functions σj’s and transformations
Ti’s such that {σ1, . . . , σn} and {T1, . . . ,Tn} are the set of all projection maps
with selecting a random permutation π as an additional secret parameter,
then we obtain a standard shuffle defined in Definition 3.2.1. Note that in
this case, i, j ∈ [1, n].
4.2.2 Security Model
In this section we give the security definition for generalized shuffle. Before
describing the formal definition we identify which classes of entities partici-
pate in a given shuffle scheme. Our security definition for shuffle also follows
the definition given by [NSK04], but we need to slightly modify their security
defintion since the secret parameter does not contain a private permutation
any more.
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Participating Parties
In our description, we use a few classes of entities which participate in shuffle.
– Senders. There are an arbitrary number of senders participating in
a shuffle scheme (we will denote the number of senders by n). Each
sender has a secret input.
– Shuffler. A shuffler receives the n ciphertexts of all the senders and
outputs the n ciphertexts as a result of shuffle.
– Verifier. A verifier is a party that verifies that the shuffler correctly
follows the shuffle scheme. Although there can be many verifiers (and
senders can be verifiers as well) the verifiers are deterministic and use
only public information, so we model them as a single party.
– Adversary. The adversary attempts to subvert a shuffle scheme. We
detail the adversarial model in the later.
Security Definition
As mentioned in [NSK04], one of the primary requirements for being secure
is verifiability and the other is unlinkability. Roughly speaking, verifiability
means that a malicious shuffler cannot produce an incorrect output without
detection by verifiers. What means that a shuffle scheme is unlinkable is
that it is hard to find a permutation from input ciphertexts and output
ciphertexts.
the adversary is PPT bounded and can be either semi-honest or malicious.
A semi-honest party is assumed to follow the protocol exactly as what is
prescribed by the protocol, except that it analyzes the records of intermediate
computations. On the other hand, a malicious party can arbitrarily deviate
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from the protocol. However, we will not consider preventing those malicious
behaviors such as independently and arbitrarily selecting inputs from the
message space, and quitting the protocol at any step.
Verifiability. For a generalized shuffle scheme, we first modify the shuffle
relation described in Eq. (3.2.1). A generalized shuffle relation Φ̃(x,w) is
satisfied if the witness w = (s1, . . . , s`) demonstrates that
∃ (s1, . . . , s`) ,∀ j ∈ [1, `] : ĉj = ReRandpk (σj(c1, . . . , cn), sj) . (4.2.2)
The completeness condition of a proof system requires that for all x =
(δ, c, ĉ) ∈ LΦ̃, the verification algorithm V of the proof system always ac-
cept. The soundness condition requires that if x 6∈ LΦ̃, then V rejects with
overwhelming probability. Verifiability is formally rephrased in Appendix ??.
Recall that our eventual goal is to construct a public shuffle scheme. Ac-
cording to our definition, the public shuffle scheme makes its shuffle algorithm
run without any secret information. What this means is that we need to use
a different technique from zero-knowledge proofs for checking whether a shuf-
fler works correctly. Indeed it can be easily done by re-computing what the
shuffler computed only using public values. Let denote ε the empty string.
We define a public shuffle relation Φ̃Pub(x,w) with the witness w = ε that
holds if
∃(σ1, . . . , σ`),∀j ∈ [1, `] : ĉj = σj(c1, . . . , cn) (4.2.3)
where x = (δ, c, ĉ) and δ, c with ĉ defined as in Definition 4.2.1. Since σj∈[1,`]
is a public n-argument function, any verifier is able to check whether a public
shuffler is cheating or not. It is straightforward to define completeness and
soundness of a proof system for a public shuffle relation with associated
language LΦ̃Pub .
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Unlinkability. In order to show that a verifiable secret shuffle is unlikable,
Nguyen et al. [NSK04] proposed two security models: Chosen Permutation
Attack (CPAΣ) and Chosen Transcript Attack (CTAΣ). The CPAΣ security
condition requires that even though the adversary A chooses two permuta-
tions of his choice, it should not distinguish which permutation was used to
produce an output list of ciphertexts, with non-negligible advantage. On the
other hand, the CTAΣ security notion states that although the adversary can
query an inversion oracle on (c, ĉ), which will give A a permutation π such
that ĉπ(i) = ReRand(ci, ·) for all i ∈ [1, |c|], it should not have non-negligible
advantage in guessing which of the two permutations in its challenge was
used. The unlinkability security experiment by Nguyen et al. [NSK04] is
shown in Chapter 3.
Obviously a generalized shuffle however does not take a permutation as a
secret parameter, so we cannot directly apply the Nguyen et al.’s model to
prove the unlinkability security of generalized shuffles. Recall that even if a
generalized shuffle scheme requires only a list of randomness in its definition
as a secret parameter, it is a secret shuffle. We need a new one, but this is
not very much different from the Nguyen et al.’s model. For completeness,
we provide the security model for unlinkability of generalized secret shuffles.
Now we consider the case that a generalized shuffle scheme does not
require even a list of randomness, i.e., during shuffling a shuffler does not use
any secret information. We see that we cannot rely on the Nguyen et al.’s
model at all. Instead we define a specific security experiment for generalized
public shuffles.
Definition 4.2.2 (Unlinkability for a Public Shuffle). Let Φ̃E = (Setup, Shuffle,Verify)
be a generalized shuffle scheme and A = (A1,A2) be an adversary.
Experiment ExpPubShfA (Φ̃E , λ)
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δ ← Setup(λ, n, `);
(state, π0, π1,m) ← AOD1 (δ, n, `) where πi ∈ Σn, i ∈ {0, 1} and
m = (m1, . . . ,mn);







b′ ← AOD2 (ĉ, c, state);
where OD is the decryption oracle and the empty string is denoted by
ε.
In the experiment above, A2 is not permitted make the query OD(ci) for
all ci∈[1,n] ∈ c. We define the advantage of an adversary A, running in
probabilistic polynomial time and making a polynomial number of queries,
as:
AdvPubShfA (Φ̃E , λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[b = b′]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
A generalized public shuffle scheme is unlikable if the advantage AdvPubShfA (Φ̃E , λ)
is negligible in the security parameter λ.
4.2.3 Cryptographic Assumption
Let Gq be a cyclic group of order q, not necessarily prime, with a generator
g. Given an algorithm D, that takes as input quadruples of group elements
and outputs a bit, the DDH-advantage of D with a generator g is defined as
AdvddhD,g(λ) :=




$←− Zq : D(g, gα, gβ, gγ) = 1
]∣∣∣ .
If AdvddhD,g is negligible for any polynomial time adversary D and any gener-
ator g, we say that the DDH assumption holds for Gq.
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We consider a group Gq where DDH problem is hard. It induces a sub-
group of order q in the group of modular residues Z×p such that q|(p − 1),
‖p‖= 2048, ‖q‖= 256 and a group of points on an elliptic curve with order q
for ‖q‖= 256. For more examples of groups, refer to [Bon98].
4.3 Constructions from Ring Homomorphic
Encryption
In this section we provide two instantiations of generalized public shuffle us-
ing a ring homomorphic cryptosystem. That is, both shuffle schemes work
correctly without a secret parameter such as a private permutation. Let
us denote (ρ, η)-E a ring homomorphic cryptosystem supports ρ additions
and η multiplications on encrypted data. For example, the BGN cryptosys-















and n2 = n − 1. Consider a semantically secure cryptosys-
tem (n1, n2)-E on a Unique Factorization Domain (UFD), which allows re-
randomization. Each message mi is encrypted into ci ∈ Enc(n1,n2)pk (mi) by
each sender Si for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. After receiving all the ci’s from each sender, a
shuffler computes ĉk = σk(c1, . . . , cn) ∈ Enc(n1,n2)pk (σk(m1, . . . ,mn)) where σk
is the k-elementary symmetric polynomial with
σk(x1, . . . , xn) =
∑
1≤i1<...<ik≤n
xi1 · · ·xik ,
for each k ∈ [1, `]. Since the underlying encryption is a ring homomorphism,
the shuffler can carry out such computations over ciphertexts.
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Lemma 4.3.1. Assuming that there exists a ring homomorphic cryptosystem
(n1, n2)-E that meets the conditions required in the construction above, our
generalized shuffle scheme based on (n1, n2)-E is correct.
Proof. Decrypting an `-tuple ciphertext {ĉ1, . . . , ĉ`} received from the shuffle
protocol, any party who holds the private key sk learns all the coefficients
of F (t) =
∏n
i=1(t − mi) ∈ R[t]. Since R[t] is also a UFD, F (t) is uniquely
factorized into irreducibles (t−mi). For example, such a computation clearly
runs in polynomial time in log p on R = Fp. Since a factorization algorithm







any permutation π of n elements, by the Definition 4.2.1 ĉ1, . . . , ĉ` can be
regarded as a generalized shuffle of c1, . . . , cn.
4.3.2 Construction from (1, n)-E
We base another generalized shuffle scheme on (1, n)-E that is a ring ho-
momorphic cryptosystem that supports 1 addition and n multiplications
on ciphertexts, and re-randomization. In this construction, the intuition
is that a shuffler first publishes all ĉj ∈ Enc(1,n)pk (B(αj)), 1 ≤ j ≤ ` for
B(t) =
∏n
i=1(t+mi) where αj’s are chosen uniformly at random from a ran-
dom space. After decrypting properly, B(t) is recovered through Lagrange
interpolation and then factorized into each linear term as above.
Lemma 4.3.2. Assuming that there exists a ring homomorphic cryptosystem
(1, n)-E that meets the conditions required in the construction above, our
generalized shuffle scheme based on (1, n)-E is correct.
Proof. . Suppose that the shuffler follows the above algorithm properly. If
one takes each transformation Ti (1 ≤ i ≤ n) as running a polynomial
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reconstruct algorithm and a factorization algorithm in turn, then he can
easily see that the correctness condition – Eq. (4.2.1) holds.
More specifically, anyone who can decrypt takes as input (ĉ1, . . . , ĉ`), and
outputs
∏n
i=1(αj +mi) for each j ∈ [1, `]. Then he reconstructs a polynomial
B(t) =
∏n










Finally {m1, . . . ,mn} can be recovered by using a factorization algorithm
over the message space.
Computational Complexity. Denote by E and D the cost of an encryp-
tion algorithm and a decryption algorithm for an underlying cryptosystem,
respectively. MD denotes the cost of multiplication in a domain D. Addi-
tionally, M(d) denotes the cost of multiplication of two d-bit integers, and
M(d, p) the cost of multiplication of two polynomials of degree d over Fp.
Each sender only has to encrypt his message once. The shuffler computes
Enc
(1,n)





for each j ∈ [1, n], whose complexity is n E and n(n−1) MFp , if Cpk = Fp. In
summary, the total complexity amounts to O(n)(E)+O(n2) MFp , on R = Fp.
For completeness we present the total complexity including a process
recovering input plaintexts. Anyone who is authorized to decrypt should
decrypt ĉ1, . . . , ĉ` and reconstruct the polynomial B(x) of degree n with
complexity ` D + O(n2) MFp . Further, this incurs O(n
2 log p) MFp to fac-
torize using Cantor-Zassenhaus algorithm [CZ81], if R = Fp. Hence, the
total complexity amounts to O(`)(E + D) +O(n2 log p) MFp , on R = Fp.
Ciphertext Size. The number of ciphertexts each sender sends is 1. The
shuffler takes as input n ciphertexts and outputs ` another ciphertexts.
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4.4 Constructions from Group Homomorphic
Encryption
The constructions presented in the previous section require the use of a ring
homomorphic encryption scheme, which currently may not be practical, but
apparently would be an overkill for applications such as shuffle. In this
section we show how to construct generalized public shuffle schemes using an
encryption scheme with only a group homomorphism, specifically ElGamal
encryption [El 84]. We extend it to be secure against the malicious adversary
and analyze its security. The first generalized shuffle scheme extensively uses
ElGamal encryption over extension fields. The other shuffle scheme is based
on ElGamal encryption on prime fields, so it is more intuitive than the former
but has a restriction on the size of input messages.
4.4.1 Building Blocks
We present some building blocks used to construct generalized public shuffle
schemes.
ElGamal Encryption over Fp3
An ElGamal encryption scheme over Fp3 consists of the following three poly-
nomial time algorithms (KG,Enc,Dec):
– KG(1λ): The key generation algorithm chooses a large prime p such
that (p3 − 1) = (p − 1)(p2 + p + 1) = 2q1q2 for large primes q1, q2.
Then select an irreducible polynomial ℘(t) ∈ Fp[t] of degree 3 and a
generator g(t) from Gq1q2 which is a multiplicative subgroup of F×p3 of
order q1q2. It computes y(t) = g(t)
x mod ℘(t) where a secret key x
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is randomly chosen from [0, p3 − 2], and publishes a public key pk =
〈p,Gq1q2 , g(t), y(t), ℘(t)〉.
– Encpk(m(t)): Encryption with the public key pk and message m(t) ∈
Gq1q2 proceeds as follows. First, a random value r ∈ [0, p3−2] is chosen.
The ciphertext is then published as:
C(t) = (v(t), u(t)) := (g(t)r mod ℘(t),m(t) · y(t)r mod ℘(t)) .
– Decsk(C(x)): Suppose that a ciphertext C(t) is encrypted with a pub-
lic key pk and we have a secret key x. Then, the ciphertext can be
decrypted as:
m(t) ≡ u(t) · v(t)−x mod ℘(t).
Parameter Generation. First, we check whether there exists a large
prime p such that p3 − 1 = (p− 1)(p2 + p+ 1), and p = 2q1 + 1 and a prime
q2 = p
2 + p + 1. Assuming the Bateman-Horn conjecture [BH62, BS62],
the number of primes of the form (pd − 1)/(p − 1) = ψd(p) not exceeding t,





for a constant c ≈ 2 where ψd(p) is the d-th cyclotomic polynomial. There-
fore, we see that the probability that ψd(p) is prime for an integer p  t is
significant.
In addition, we need to choose a sufficiently large prime p to resist against
the index-calculus attack. In order to obtain the ElGamal encryption scheme
with semantic security, we take two subgroups Gq1 and Gq2 as follows:
Gq1 = {a(t)2q2 : a(t) ∈ (Fp[t]/℘(t))×} and Gq2 = {a(t)2q1 : a(t) ∈ (Fp[t]/℘(t))×}.
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In particular, we set a generator g = g1g2 of Gq1q2 such that 〈g1〉 = Gq1 and
〈g2〉 = Gq2 .
Security Analysis. Now we verify whether the DDH assumption holds in
Gq1q2 .
Lemma 4.4.1. Let Gq1 and Gq2 be groups of prime order q1, q2, respectively,
where gcd(q1, q2) = 1. Suppose that the DDH assumption holds in Gq1 and
Gq2. Then the DDH assumption holds in the group Gq1q2.
Proof. Suppose that there exists an algorithm D and a generator g0 ∈ Gq1q2
such that AdvddhD,g0 is not negligible. We want to show that there exists an
algorithm D′ and generator g1 ∈ Gq1 such that AdvddhD′,g1 is not negligible.
Choose g1 := g
q2







We first choose a triple of random values x, y, z
















and submit the quadruple to D. According that c = ab or c is a random
value in Zq1q2 , the distinguisher will answer the query. Hence, if the output
of D is 1, then ab ≡ c mod q1. A similar argument holds for Gq2 .
Message Encoding. Since a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ or m ∈ Fp in general,
we need to give a way to encode the message into a message space of our
ElGamal encryption. Without loss of generality, suppose that a message
m ∈ Fp. We write the message m by m(t) := t − m. We then encrypt
m(t) using the ElGmal encryption scheme over Fp3 . As a result, to provide
a natural encoding that embeds an input m(t) ∈ Fp[t] into Gq1q2 , we should
slightly modify the encryption algorithm Encpk(·) as follows:
u(t) = m(t)2 · y(t)r mod ℘(t),
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while keeping v(t) unchanged. We can easily check that the modified El-
Gamal encryption scheme with this message encoding is semantically secure
under the DDH assumption in Gq1q2 by Lemma 4.4.1.
Keeping the Shuffler Honest without Zero-knowledge Proofs
One crucial property of our construction allows to prevent a shuffler from
behavior maliciously without depending on zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs).
This gets rid of the expensive cost of computation and communication re-
quired for ZKPs mandatorily. For this purpose, a verifier only have to re-
compute the shuffler’s output using public values.
4.4.2 A Generalized Public Shuffle Scheme Based on
Polynomial Factorization
We begin with describing extended ElGamal encryption over Fp3 . Then we
present our public shuffle using the extended ElGamal encryption scheme
which is also semantically secure assuming the DDH assumption in a cyclic
subgroup of F×p3 holds.
Extended ElGamal Encryption
Embedding our basic idea into constructing a generalized public shuffle scheme
requires that we modify basic ElGamal encryption over Fp3 given as a build-
ing block above. We just describe modifications for extended ElGamal en-
cryption over Fp3 . According to modified parameters, its encryption and
decryption algorithms should be modified as follows:
– Modifying Key Generation. We run KG(1λ) as in the basic scheme.
Further, choose ` irreducible polynomials ℘1(t), . . . , ℘`(t) ∈ Fp[t] of
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degree 3. Find a field isomorphism φj : Fp[t]/℘(t) → Fp[t]/℘j(t) for
j ∈ [1, `]. Finally compute yj = φj(y) for j ∈ [1, `], and publish
pk = (g, y, {yi}`i=1,Gq1q2 , ℘(t), {℘i(t)}`i=1, {φi}`i=1) and keep a secret key
sk = x.
– Modifying Encryption and Decryption Algorithms. We define `-tuple
ElGamal encryption by extending ElGamal encryption over Fp3 . Given




gr,m(t)2 · yr1, . . . ,m(t)2 · yr`
)
∈
Fp[t]/℘(t)× Fp[t]/℘1(t)× · · · × Fp[t]/℘`(t).
For decryption, first compute φj(g
r) and m(t)2 ≡ (φj(gr))−x ·m(t)2 · yrj
mod ℘j. Then we get m(t)
2 (mod ℘1 · · ·℘`) using the Chinese remain-
dering algorithm (in short, CRT). After computing square root of the
value, we get m(t),−m(t) (mod ℘1 · · ·℘`). Since m(t) is linear, we can
determine the original message m(t) uniquely.
The Construction
We describe the generalized shuffle using the `-tuple ElGamal encryption
scheme over extension fields.
Setup(1λ, n, `). This algorithm is run by the shuffler and takes a security
parameter λ and the input size n. It outputs a description of σ :
(Gq1q2)n → Gq1q2 given by (c1, . . . , cn) 7→ c1 · · · cn along with the public
key pk, i.e., δ = (pk, σ).
Shuffle(δ, c). Shuffling with the public parameter δ and a list of ciphertexts
c = (c1, . . . , cn) where ci is an `-tuple ElGamal ciphertext, given from
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2 · yri1 ,mi(t)2 · y
ri




$←− [0, p3 − 2] for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
1. The shuffler computes
∏n
i=1 `-Enc(mi(t)) where the product of





σ (gr1 , . . . , grn) , σ
(
m1(t)
2 · yr11 , . . . ,mn(t)2 · yrn1
)


























And for all j ∈ [1, `] set
ĉj =









2. The shuffler outputs a list of ciphertexts ĉ = (ĉ1, . . . , ĉ`) along
with a proof Γ = ε.
Verify(δ, c, ĉ,Γ). Upon receiving this tuple, the verifier will first run the ver-
ification algorithm by non-interactively running V(δ, c, ĉ,Γ) – whether
all ĉj ∈ ĉ were correctly computed by using c from senders and δ; if
this fails abort and return reject. Otherwise, output accept.
Theorem 4.4.1. If the shuffler performs correctly the scheme, our public
shuffle scheme is correct.
Proof. We take each transformation Ti (1 ≤ i ≤ n) as running the CRT, a
square root finding algorithm, and a factorization algorithm in turn. The
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correctness of shuffle can be easily checked. We know that if one knows the
















mod ℘1(t) · · ·℘`(t) from each (
∏n
i=1mi(t))
2 mod ℘j(t) by using a Chinese re-
mainder algorithm. He obtains
∏n




over Fp[t], since m(t) is monic. Finally a factorization algorithm outputs
{m1, . . . ,mn}.
According to our definitions, the next theorem proves that the generalized
public shuffle satisfies unlinkability if the DDH assumption holds.
Theorem 4.4.2. Assuming the DDH assumption holds, our public shuffle
scheme is unlinkable.
Proof. We now construct a CCA1 adversary Acca that works as follows. A
graphical representation of the attacker is given in Figure 4.1. First, Acca sets
δ = pk and gets the system parameter w as defined in its definition. Then
as a shuffle challenger, B = Acca sends δ, w to the shuffle adversary A. The
adversary A choose a pair of permutations π0, π1 ∈ Σn of his choice and a
list of messages m = (m1, . . . ,mn) ∈ (Mpk)n, and sends all of these values to
B = Acca. Acca gets a random bit b
$←− {0, 1}, from this choose a permutation
πb. Next, it computes ci = Enc
d
pk(mπb(i), ri) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and c =
∏n
i=1 ci,
and sends (c1, . . . , cn) and c to the adversary. The adversary verifies all
computations; if this fails abort. Otherwise it can query the decryption
oracle OD on c. The only problem is that Acca does not have sk. Here, we
use the fact that E is CCA2-secure and so in the CCA1 experiment, Acca
can use the decryption oracle to decrypt everything. However, Acca cannot
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query OD on all ci’s and its challenge c∗. This is the important point of this
proof here. After finishing its training phase, the adversary sends to Acca its
challenge consisting of a pair of challenge permutations π∗0, π
∗
1 ∈ Σn and a
list of challenge messages m∗ = (m∗1, . . . ,m
∗
n). On receiving the challenge,
Acca does the following according to a random bit b
$←− {0, 1} and a random
index j
$←− [1, n]:
1. Prepare a pair of challenge messages, m̄0 = 1 and m̄
∗
1 = mπ∗1(j);
2. Send m̄∗0, m̄
∗
1 to the CCA1 challenger as its challenge;





∗) where β is a random bit chosen by the
CCA1 challenger;







, r∗i ) if b = 0
cβ if b = 1











i and send it to the adversary.
Note that the adversary is not allowed to query OD on all c∗i ’s and the
challenge ciphertext c∗. Further, due to the restriction of CCA1 experiment
the adversary cannot utilize the decryption oracle any more. When the
adversary sends its guess b′ to the shuffle challenger, Acca outputs its guess
β′ = b′ to the CCA1 challenger.
From here on, we can see that Acca perfectly simulates the generalized
public shuffle experiment for the adversary A. So far we have discussed the
attack strategy by Acca, and so we now proceed to prove that Acca outputs
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the correct β with probability ε(λ)+1
2
which is non-negligible if ε(λ) is non-
negligible.
Define Fail to be the event causing Acca to output a random bit in
its attack. Further, we say that the generalized public shuffle experiment













ExpPubShfA (Φ̃E , λ) = 1|Fail
]
· Pr[Fail].
Now, by the definition of Fail, we have that Pr
[





. It can be seen that the probability Acca outputs an incorrect bit with Fail
not happening is negligible, and
Pr
[
ExpPubShfA (Φ̃E , λ) = 1|¬Fail
]
≥ 1− negl(λ)
for some negligible function negl(·). Then we compute Pr[Fail] and Pr[¬Fail].
By the assumption regarding A, we assume that the advantage A breaks our
shuffle is ε(λ). Thus, Pr[¬Fail] = ε(λ). In contrast, when A fails to output
a correct bit, then Acca always outputs an incorrect bit. Thus, Pr[Fail] =
1− ε(λ). Combining the above, we have
Pr
[
ExpPubShfA (Φ̃E , λ) = 1
]
= (1− negl(λ)) · ε(λ) + 1
2
· (1− ε(λ))








Thus, if ε(λ) is non-negligible, thenAcca succeeds in the generalized public
shuffle experiment with non-negligible probability.
Theorem 4.4.3. Assuming the DDH assumption holds, our public shuffle
scheme is verifiable.
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Figure 4.1: Graphical View of Security
Proof. It follows from the fact that completeness and soundness conditions
can be easily checked by the verifier’s re-computation.
Computational Complexity. Each sender encrypts his plaintext ` times
with O(` log p) MFp complexity. The shuffler computes the product of en-
crypted data. It takes O(n`) MFp . The shuffler computes isomorphism
φj(g(t)
∑n
i=1 ri) = g(φj(t))
∑n
i=1 ri , 1 ≤ j ≤ `, with O(`) MFp using Horner’s rule.
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i=1 ℘i(t) requiresO(` log p) MFp , and factoring
∏n
i=1mi(t)
over Fp[t] incurs O(n2 log p) MFp . Therefore, the total complexity amounts
to O(n2 log p) MFp .
Ciphertext Size. The number of ciphertexts each sender transmits is O(`)
and the shuffler takes as input O(n`) ciphertexts and outputs O(`) cipher-
texts.
Keeping the Sender Honest
To prevent the sender himself from attempting to cheat the shuffle, we require
that each sender should be prepared to give a zero-knowledge proof of the
plaintext of his ciphertext. For example, given an ElGamal ciphertext c =
(u, v) = (gr,myr) under the public key y, a sender prover knowledge of m by
instead proving knowledge of r.
It is unlikely to detect all malicious behavior of dishonest senders during
encoding and encrypting their messages. Instead we can deal with the case
where a malicious sender replaces at most α positions with random values
of his choice instead of all the same mi’s. When decrypting the output
of the shuffle, after applying the CRT, we will run the extended Euclidean
algorithm and apply the rational reconstruction theorem [Sho09, Sec. 4.6].
If the number of malicious positions is at most α, we can efficiently recover
the original value mi from its malicious encoding. The polynomial analog
takes the same approach [Sho09, Sec. 17.5].
57
CHAPTER 4. VERIFIABLE PUBLIC SHUFFLES
4.4.3 A Generalized Public Shuffle Scheme Based on
Integer Factorization
In this section we present another public shuffle which can work correctly and
efficiently, especially when each user has short messages enough to support
recovering original messages in polynomial time. However, the intuition is
the same as the public shuffle scheme given in Section 4.4.2.
This construction uses `-tuple ElGamal encryption extended by standard
ElGamal encryption over prime fields. We just describe the differences com-
pared to that used in Section 4.4.2: (1) Since a field isomorphism is not
available, each user should send ` full ElGamal ciphertexts to a shuffler.
Namely, the number of group elements transmitted by each sender is 2`.
Recall that the previous construction allows a sender to send (` + 1) group
elements; (2) For unique factorization over the integers, we should provide a
specific encoding algorithm. For example, the encoding algorithm converts
an input message into a prime number in a message space. If no confusion
arises, we abuse notation and use the same symbol for extended ElGamal
encryption. The full description of ElGamal and its extension over prime
fields are as follows.
ElGamal and Its Extension over Prime Fields
The description of the ElGamal encryption scheme E = (KG,Enc,Dec) over
prime fields consists of the following algorithms. Let Fp be a prime field and
Gq be a multiplicative cyclic subgroup of order q in F×p , where p = 2q + 1.
Assume that the DDH assumption holds in Gq.
– KG(1λ). Choose a generator g of Gq. Choose a random x ∈ [0, q − 2]
and compute y = gx (mod p). A public key is pk = (p, g, y,Gq) and a
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secret key is sk = x.
– Encpk(m). Choose random r ∈ [0, q − 2] and compute gr and m · yr.
The ciphertext of m ∈ Gq is given by (v, u) = (gr,m · yr).
– Decsk(v, u). Compute m = v
−xu (mod p).
If the input message m ∈ Gq, then the encryption algorithm simply con-
tinues to the next step. However, if m 6∈ Gq, it is required to convert m
into an element of the group. Thus, we need to modify its encryption algo-
rithm into computing u = m2 · yr (mod p). Also we define `-tuple ElGamal







2yr2, . . . , g
r
` ,m
2yr` ) ∈ F2p1 × F
2
p2
× · · · × F2p` ,
where p1 < p2 < · · · < p` are add primes and yj = gxj for all j ∈ [1, `].
Actually, since we use factorization to get message, message space must
be prime set which is smaller than p1. Instead we use encoding to remove
restriction of plaintexts. There is a plaintext incoding algorithm Ω to make
prime number. We instantiate an message encoding algorithm Ω as follows:
We first assign a prime number to a message by a small-sized random padding
and check whether the padded message is a prime number. Namely, we
append a padding s to the message m̄, and then check whether m = m̄ ‖ s
is a prime number. When we define m̄ ‖ s = m̄log s + s, the size of s is
determined by the distribution of primes. Let π(m) be the number of primes
equal to or less than m. Huxley [Hux72] proved that
π(m+ ∆(m))− π(m) ∼ ∆(m)
logm
is true for almost all x if ∆(m) = m1/6+ε (ε > 0 fixed). (See [Mai85] for a
survey on this topic.) This result implies that there exists a prime number
if ‖s‖= dκ
6
e with overwhelming probability, where κ =‖m‖.
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The Construction
The following is the description of the generalized shuffle using the `-tuple
ElGamal encryption scheme over prime fields.
Setup(1λ, n, `). This algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ and size
parameters n, `, outputs a public parameter δ = (pk).
Shuffle(δ, c). Shuffling with the public parameter δ and a list of ciphertexts
c = (c1, . . . , cn) where ci ∈ `-Encpk(mi) from a sender Si, proceeds as
follows. Here `-Encpk(mi) = {(vij, uij)}`j=1 with vij = g
rij





1. The shuffler computes and outputs


















with a proof Γ = ε.
Verify(δ, c, ĉ,Γ). The verification algorithm checks if each ĉj ∈ ĉ was cor-
rectly computed by using c and δ; if this fails abort and return reject.
Otherwise, output accept.
Theorem 4.4.4. If the shuffler performs correctly, our public shuffle scheme
is correct.
Proof. Suppose that the shuffler follows the above algorithm properly. We
take each transformation Ti (1 ≤ i ≤ n) as running the CRT, a square root
finding algorithm and a factorization algorithm in turn. Then the correctness
of shuffle can be easily checked. Specifically, a decryption algorithm takes




i=1 uij) for 1 ≤ j ≤ `, and
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outputs
M1 = (m1m2 · · ·mn)2 (mod p1)
...
Mn = (m1m2 · · ·mn)2 (mod p`)
M = (m1m2 · · ·mn)2 mod p1 · · · p` is obtained by using the CRT. It com-
putes square roots of M modular p1 · · · p`, say z1 = m1 · · ·mn and z2 =
−m1m2 · · ·mn, respectively. Since all mi’s are odd prime numbers, the least
significant bit (LSB) of z1 is 1. On the other hand, the LSB of z2 is 0 since
p1 · · · p` − m1 · · ·mn = −m1 · · ·mn (mod p1 · · · p`). Hence, it can uniquely
determine which one is a correct product of {m1, . . . ,mn}. Finally it runs
a factorization algorithm for m1 · · ·mn over Z using trial division since mi’s
are small.
Further, with respect to unlinkability and public verifiability it is straight-
forward from a similar argument proved in the previous section.
Computational Complexity. Let us define p̌ = max{p1, . . . , p`}, and p̂ =
min{p1, . . . , p`}. Each sender encrypts his plaintext ` times withO(` log p̌) MFp




i=1 uij) for 1 ≤ j ≤ ` with
O(`2) MFp complexity. Decryption requires O(` log p̌) MFp complexity, and
computing the CRT requires O(M(log p̌) log log p̌)MFp to get (m1 · · ·mn)2
mod p1 · · · p`. Solving square roots of (m1 · · ·mn)2 mod p1 · · · p` incurs
O(n log3 p̌)) MFp . Since the message space is small, factorizing m1 · · ·mn
using trial division takes O(nm̄ log p̌) when messages are taken to be a prime
less than m̄
Ciphertext Size. The number of ciphertexts each user sends is ` and the
shuffler takes as input n` ciphertexts and outputs ` ciphertexts.
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Small Message Case. If the message space is small, the shuffle algo-
rithm may output (ĉ1, . . . , ĉ`) for ` < n. This reduces the computation and
transmission cost. Suppose each message is encoded into a prime of κ bits.
Decrypting (ĉ1, . . . , ĉ`) gives (m1 · · ·mn)2 mod p1 · · · p`. One can recover an
integer m1 · · ·mn when 2nκ < `‖p‖, i.e. ` > (2nκ)/‖p‖.
For example, consider κ = 10, n = 104 and ‖p‖= 2048. Then it is enough
to take ` = 98, which is much less than n = 104.
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Conclusion and Further Work
In this dissertation, we describe the definition of verifiable secret shuffles,
its security model, and limitations that they have. Then we studied how
to construct a public shuffle, which does not require any private setup for
generating a random permutation. For this purpose, we proposed two con-
structions. Our constructions use ElGamal encryption schemes,but one is
based on integer factorization which requires exponential complexity in gen-
eral, the other is based on polynomial factorization. Further, we exploit a
field isomorphism to reduce the size of ciphertexts.
However, still there are two remaining open problems. The first one is
that our schemes let each sender transmit O(n) ciphertexts to a shuffler.
Therefore, the total transmission complexity is O(n2). Thus, how to con-
struct a public shuffle scheme with O(n) transmission complexity in total is
an interesting problem. The second one is to apply our technique to Adida
and Wikström’s work. Namely, how to generate an obfuscated permutation
matrix by using our scheme is also an interesting question.
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본 논문은 공개 셔플 (Shuffle) 을 설계하고 구축하는 방법에 대해서 제
시한다. 일반적으로 표준 셔플은 메시지를 셔플하는 주체가 랜덤 치환
(Permutation) 과 랜덤값을 안전하게 비밀로 유지하는 것을 요구한다. 그
러나, 이러한 비밀값들을 항상 안전하게 유지할 수 있다고 기대하는 것은
경우에따라매우강한가정일수있으며,심지어현실에서는적용할수없
는 경우가 있다. 그래서 본 연구에서 이러한 가정을 약화시키면서 안전하
게 셔플을 수행할 수 있는 방법에 대해서 제시한다.
셔플의 대표적인 응용인 믹스넷 (Mix-net) 은 익명화 (Anonymization)
을 위한 보편적 수단의 하나이다. 믹스넷은 입력된 암호화된 값을 치환하
고 재암호화하거나 복호화하는 방법을 많이 이용된다. 만약 믹스넷을 구
성하는 믹스서버가 적어도 하나 정직하게 행동한다면 입력과 출력의 연결
성은 안전하게 숨겨질 것이다. 그래서 연결성이 안전하게 숨겨지는 것을
보장되기 위해서는 믹스를 담당하는 서버가 믹스 프로토콜을 따라 동작하
도록 보장할 필요가 있다. 이를 위한 별도의 수단으로 영지식증명을 사용




하는 주체가 일체의 비밀정보를 모르는 상태에서 셔플을 할 수 있도록 한
다. 이러한목적을위해서그들의기법은암호화된치환행렬 (Permutation
Matrix) 을 공개하면 셔플을 필요로 하는 사용자들이 공개된 치환행렬을
이용하여 암호화된 값들을 셔플할 수 있다. 즉석 (On-the-fly) 에서 셔플을
해야 하는 기존의 기법에 비해서 그들의 방법은 믹스넷을 구축할때 복호
화하는 알고리즘과 복잡도만 고려하는 것을 허용한다. 그러나, 그들의 기
법이 공개적으로 셔플을 하는 것을 가능하게 했지만, 랜덤 치환과 랜덤값
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은 여전히 셔플을 생성하는 제 3의 신뢰기관이 알아야 하는 상황으로 변경
되었을 뿐 비밀값 자체를 시스템에서 제거한 것은 아니다. 또한 셔플을 공
개할 때 정당하게 생성된 셔플이라는 것을 증명하기 위해 여전히 영지식
증명도 필요하다.
본 논문에서는 기존 셔플–비밀셔플이나 Adida와 Wikström의 기법–과
달리 랜덤 치환과 랜덤값을 사용하지 않고 공개적으로 셔플을 허용하는
공개 셔플 (Public Shuffle) 을 제안한다: n개의 암호문 (c1, . . . , cn)이 주어
지면 우리가 제시한 기법은 fi(c1, . . . , cn), 1 ≤ i ≤ `, 을 계산한다, 여기서
fi(x1, . . . , xn)는 x1, . . . , xn을 매개변수로 하는 대칭함수이다. 본 논문은 적
용되는 대칭함수에 따라 크게 두 가지 설계가 가능함을 보인다. 첫번째
는 환준동형 (Ring Homomorphic) 암호시스템을 사용하는 것이고 장점으
로는상수크기의암호문만요구한다는것이다. 두번째는군준동형 (Group
Homomorphic) 암호시스템을 사용하는 것으로 사용자수에 선형 크기의 암
호문 개수를 요구한다. 그러나 두 기법 모두 랜덤 치환이나 랜덤값을 요구
하지않으며,아울러영지식증명을사용하지않고공개적으로셔플이옳게
이루어졌는지 확인할 수 있는 방법을 제공한다.




아직도 많이 부족한 저의 지도교수가 되어 주시고, 박사학위기간 동안 공
부하고 연구할 수 있도록 물심양면(物心兩面)으로 지원하고 가르침을 주
신 천정희(千丁熙) 선생님께 먼저 진심으로 감사드립니다. 바쁘신 와중에
심사위원으로 참여하여 주신 김명환 선생님, 이인석 선생님, 이향숙 선생
님, 특히 먼곳에서 기꺼이 참여하여 주신 김용대 선생님께 감사드립니다.
암호학적 난제 연구단의 모든 동료들도 고맙습니다: 김민규, 김성욱,
김홍태,이형태,김태찬,류한솔,김진수,홍현숙,정희원,그리고이주은씨:
모두 보고 싶을 겁니다! Minnesota에서 지내는 동안 여러가지 도움을 준
박동철, Abadelaziz Mohaisen에게도 감사의 마음을 전합니다.
함께 연구하고 여러가지 助言을 아끼지 않았던 입학동기 이형태와 박
사학위기간 내내 성실하고 열정적인 모습으로 자극을 준 배영진, 그리고
사소한 일까지 챙겨준 팀장 김태찬에게 이 글을 빌어 고맙다는 말을 전합
니다. 또한 자연스런 삶을 모습을 보여주시는 형석형님과 대인이신 종승
형님께도 감사하는 마음을 잊을 수 없습니다. 함께 있는 것만으로도 힘이
되는친구들–재철,재형과문선도고맙다는말을받아야합니다. 열심히살
고 있는 학수와 지영도 마찬가지입니다. 힘들때 이들의 그늘이 있어 쉬었
다 갈 수 있었습니다.
끝으로 공부하는 동안 내내 애정과 격려의 말로 묵묵히 기다려준 제 아
내, 은영에게 온 마음으로 고맙다는 말을 하고 싶습니다. 또한 함께 힘들
어 하신 어머니와 누이–세종엄마, 그리고 묵묵히 지켜봐 주신 장인과 장모
님께도 감사드립니다.
學而時習之면 不亦說乎아!
〈〈論語-學而〉〉
